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Jonathan Edwards scholarship has been divided in recent years on the correct interpretation of
his work. Scholars like Sang Hyun Lee and Amy Plantinga Pauw maintain that Edwards used a
radically new dispositional ontology to understand the fundamental realities of nature. Oliver
Crisp, Kyle Strobel, and Steve Studebaker have argued that Edwards used an essentialist
ontology. I will defend the latter position and explain how it is tied to Edwards’s Trinitarianism. I
argue for an interpretation of Edwards that situates him in his historical and theological context.
The early modern philosophy of his day was marked by essentialist ontology. The Reformed
tradition of his day was marked by understanding the Trinity in an orthodox way. I argue that
Edwards combined both of these themes in his philosophy and theology. This made for a unique
understanding of ontology and Trinitarianism, but Edwards remained within the bounds of the
philosophy and theology of his time.
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Controversy over the proper interpretation of Jonathan Edwards’ philosophy and
theology has caused recent re-engagement with his thought. Though Edwards is most widely
known for his contribution to the First Great Awakening and his famous sermon, “Sinners in the
Hands of an Angry God,” his philosophy and theology include much more than this caricature
seems to suggest. This woefully narrow selection from his body of work lends to persistent
misinterpretations of his work. In fact, he is thought to be the first American philosopher
(Wainwright). Edwards scholarship has taken a few major turns. In the middle of the nineteenth
century, Edwards was widely read and appreciated (Crisp 10). By the twentieth century, his work
was considered embarrassing because of its ties to Reformed/Puritan theology. Consequently,
Edwards soon fell out of style. In 1949, however, Perry Miller rescued Edwards from obscurity
when he published his biography on him. This reignited interest in Edwards. Miller believed that
Edwards was an intellectual genius, hindered by his outdated Puritan theology. This was a
common interpretation for the years following the biography. But, Miller’s revival in Edwards
scholarship led to Yale University publishing Edwards’s entire literary work. It was debated
whether Edwards was worthy of studying at all, considering his bold theological background.
The twenty-first century, like the centuries before, found itself similarly embroiled in controversy
over Edwards. This controversy is different, however, in that it is over the proper interpretation
of his work.
Sang Hyun Lee wrote The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards in 1988. He
interprets Edwards as introducing a radically new ontology that challenged and reconfigured
classical theological themes. This interpretation has been adopted by many Edwards scholars.
Most notably for this paper is Amy Plantinga Pauw, who understood Edwards’s radical ontology
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as tied inextricably to his Trinitarianism. As a response to this interpretation, a different view of
Edwards has emerged. This view suggests that while Edwards was an original thinker, he did not
depart from classical theological norms. Instead, he was simply attempting to explain these
themes in an early Enlightenment world. Defenders of this position, such as Oliver Crisp, Kyle
Strobel, and Steve Studebaker, suggest that Edwards did not depart from the essentialist ontology
of early modern philosophers.
In this paper, I will be defending the interpretation of Crisp, Strobel, Studebaker, and
others that do not see Edwards as presenting a radically new ontology. I will argue that Edwards
is operating within the framework of substance ontology rather than dispositional ontology. This
framework helped set the stage for Edwards’s doctrine of the Trinity. I argue that we cannot
understand his doctrine of the Trinity apart from his essentialist ontology and vice versa. These
are essential aspects to understanding the philosophy and theology of Jonathan Edwards. In order
to prove this, I will attempt to place Edwards in his right context. I will explain the context and
the relevant themes of early modern philosophy. I will demonstrate how Edwards fit neatly into
the early modern period by utilizing the same themes throughout his philosophy. Then, I will
trace the history of Trinitarian theology to show Edwards also fits neatly into this history. He was
an unusual combination of early modern philosophy and strict Reformed/Puritan theology. But,
this context sheds light on a proper understanding of his work. It illuminates Edwards as an
innovative product of his context.
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II. Early Modern Philosophical Context
Modern Philosophy
Before exploring the philosophy of Jonathan Edwards, it is important to understand the
philosophical context into which he entered. Not only was Edwards influenced by theology and
his desire for maximizing the glory of God, but he was also deeply invested in his Modern
philosophical context. Both had a profound effect on his theology and philosophy. The Early
Modern period of philosophy is generally considered to have started with Renė Descartes
(1596-1650), spanning the 17th and 18th centuries. Much of modern philosophy comes as a
response to the Reformation and the Enlightenment. Prior to the Reformation, Scholasticism was
the popular philosophical system of the day. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,
“scholasticism remained the dominant European philosophy until the fifteenth century, when it
gave way to, in turn, Renaissance humanism, rationalism, and empiricism” (Blackburn 342). It
was characterized by Catholicism and the use of the argument from authority, primarily because
only a few people had access to the Scriptures. Also, philosophy was somewhat of a collective
enterprise, much like the Church. Philosophers were working together and interacting with each
other to develop their philosophical positions. In this context, arguments from authority could be
seen as appropriate. The Reformation caused a shift in philosophy because it allowed for
personal interpretation of the Scriptures. The argument from authority began to hold less weight
as more and more people obtained access to the Bible. Descartes’ entrance into the history of
philosophy indicates a major shift in philosophical inquiry. He begins his Meditations with,
“Several years have now passed since I first realized how numerous were the false opinions that
in my youth I had taken to be true, and thus how doubtful were all those that I had subsequently
built upon them” (Descartes 27). This was drastically different from scholasticism, which was
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characterized by the absence of first-person verbiage. Descartes made a clean break from
scholastic philosophy and was on the cutting edge of a new era.
One of Descartes’s primary preoccupations was the mind-body problem. Descartes’s
work on this indelibly shaped Modern Philosophy. The problem is summed up in the question:
What is the relationship between the mind and the body, or between the physical realm and the
mental realm? Almost every Modern philosopher has a proposed solution to this problem.
Descartes’s answer to this was dualism. He asserted that the mind and body were two distinct
substances that interacted by way of the pineal gland. Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) recognized
that Descartes had a problem, because the mind and body were still dependent on God, making
them unsubstantial in the technical sense. To solve this, Leibniz proposed the existence of
monads, which were finite substances. This way, he could account for the mind and body being
distinct while maintaining dependence on God. George Berkeley (1685-1753), who came shortly
after Descartes and Leibniz, taught idealism as the solution to the mind-body problem. He
claimed that only minds and ideas existed. In this way, he did not have to explain the connection
between the mind and the body, because the body was just an extension of the mind. Though
there were other proposed solutions, these cover the spectrum in Modern philosophy.
This led to an emphasis on substance in Modern philosophy. The Modern philosophical
framework was marked by essentialism, which divided everything into substances and modes.
Each major Modern philosopher had a particular view on substance: dualism (there are only two
substances), monism (there is only one substance), or somewhere in between. Substance was a
major topic in the modern philosophical context, beginning with Descartes. Descartes suggested
that there are two substances other than God: mind and body. Spinoza noticed a problem with
this, because if mind and body were two distinct substances then they could not depend on one
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another, but Descartes’ conception seemed to overlook that. Spinoza, in turn, suggested that God
is the only substance, but sacrificed orthodoxy at this expense. Leibniz attempted to salvage
orthodoxy while acknowledging Spinoza’s critique of Descartes. Locke was the first Modern
philosopher to place less importance on substance by acknowledging that there was something
underlying objects, but he knew not what. While substance metaphysics was on the downward
trend after Locke, Berkeley and Edwards still had responses to it. Toward the end of this period,
substance became less important. Immanuel Kant, thought to be one of the last of the early
Modern philosophers, spent little time discussing substance. He was more concerned with saving
philosophy from David Hume’s undermining of philosophical inquiry. Kant’s seeming drift from
essentialism marks a break with the predominant framework of Modern philosophy.
Edwards in Modern Philosophy
Jonathan Edwards entered the Early Modern philosophical context. One of the things that
makes Edwards unique was his engagement with cutting-edge modern philosophy alongside his
theological projects. While there were many religious philosophers in the Modern period, there
were not many Reformed, Puritan thinkers as involved in philosophical work as Edwards. He
was deeply influenced by Isaac Newton (1642-1727), John Locke (1632-1704), Nicholas
Malebranche (1638-1715), and the Cambridge Platonists (17th century).
According to Edwards scholar, Paul Helm, Jonathan Edwards was heavily influenced by
John Locke’s ideas on the mind. Locke believed that “an idea is the only object of our thinking,
none of our ideas are innate, and all [simple ideas] are either ideas of sensation or reflection”
(Helm). Ideas of sensation are ideas that we get from external objects. Ideas of reflection refer to
ideas about the internal operations of our mind that we perceive or reflect upon. Reflection
includes thinking, doubting, reasoning, willing, etc. Ideas of reflection are obtained by the mind
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reflecting on its internal operations. Edwards utilizes Locke’s concept of ideas of reflection in his
treatment of the Trinity. Locke adheres to some form of mind-body dualism, though not without
hesitation. He argues that the mind, like the body, is a substratum that is likely unknowable to us,
but not unknowable to God. For Locke, the mind’s inner structure is unknowable. This structure
is what gives us the powers and dispositions of the mind. Locke argues that the will is a power of
the mind. Because of this, freedom is a power of the agent rather than a power of a distinct
faculty of the will. According to Helm, Edwards relies heavily on this unitary conception of the
will in his Discourse on the Trinity.
Nicolas Malebranche is another early modern philosopher that influenced Edwards.
Jasper Reid asserts that “it is certain that Edwards was aware of Malebranche, and highly likely
that he read at least some of his work” (Reid 152). Malebranche was a fundamentally
Augustinian philosopher. Influenced by Descartes, Malebrance’s Augustinianism was filtered
through Cartesian concerns. Two important aspects of Malebranche’s philosophy were his
adherence to an orthodox account of the Trinity and the methodological primacy of Trinity in his
metaphysical system. He understood God to be Being itself and he saw the Second Person of the
Trinity as generated by God’s own idea of Himself. He affirmed, though, that the Persons of the
Trinity were united in essence. They were all the same substance, though different Persons.
Much of this will sound familiar when we get to Edwards’s own account of ontology.
Edwards scholar, Sang Hyun Lee, claims that Edwards proposes a radically new
ontological method. He claims that Edwards rejects the substance metaphysics of his time for
dispositional ontology. It is important to see where Edwards was in the history of philosophy and
whether he created something new or synthesized the different ideas of the time. Edwards was
writing in the Newtonian era, immediately after Locke and Hobbes. There were a few
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philosophical concerns that a Christian theologian like Edwards would have. One of the main
things that Edwards was trying to refute was Hobbes’s materialism. Hobbes claimed that all that
existed was matter. For Edwards, this was an unorthodox view, because if this was the case, then
either God was simply matter or God did not exist. Edwards’s polemic against Hobbesian
materialism is most likely what led to his radical idealism. Idealism avoids the problem of
representational realism without leading to the unorthodox view that everything is matter,
because it asserts that all that exists are minds and their ideas. Representational realism was the
idea that the only things we can know directly are our own ideas, which, for Edwards, was a
problem. If this is the case, then we would have no way of coming to know the external world.
For idealists like Edwards and Berkeley, this is not a problem because the only things that truly
and properly exist are minds and their ideas. Given Edwards’s idealism, his view seems to fit
fairly neatly in this modern philosophical context.
Edwards was also concerned with Newtonian science. He was deeply interested in recent
scientific discoveries. He sought to make sense of science through his philosophy. This is why he
wanted to explain the fundamental building blocks of reality. He wanted to create a strong
Christian apology while holding to the new discoveries of the Enlightenment. This is partly why
his writings are confusing at times. He was trying to synthesize many different lines of thought
into one philosophical theology. Crisp rightly characterizes Edwards as “an intellectual magpie,
who sought to synthesize aspects of the early Enlightenment thinking with post-Reformation
scholastic metaphysics in order to offer a coherent intellectual apology for traditional Christian




Lee’s Interpretation of Edwards’s Ontology as Purely Dispositional
The interpretation of Jonathan Edwards’s ontology has created something of a difficulty
for Edwards scholars, though before Sang Hyun Lee, most believed that Edwards was working in
the early modern framework of substances and modes (Crisp 12). In his book, The Philosophical
Theology of Jonathan Edwards, Lee proposes a radically new interpretation that suggests that
Edwards abandoned the idea of substance for the notion of disposition.
Lee begins his argument by tracing the idea of habit from Aristotle through Aquinas and
into Edwards. For Edwards, habit is interchangeable with disposition. The Aristotelian
conception of habit is an active and ontologically significant principle. Aquinas amplified the
Aristotelian understanding by designating the sanctifying grace as an entitative habit, or a habit
that functions on the level of being. For Aquinas, habitus can bring a potency to a degree of
actuality without giving it full actuality. Lee argues that Edwards’s “habit” is Aristotle’s hexis
and Aquinas’ habitus in new dress. In Locke, habit actually emerges as what is directly
responsible for the very presence of relations and order among ideas in the mind. This sets the
stage for Edwards’s new conception of habit. In traditional metaphysics, habit was only an
accidental quality that played an operational role. With Hume and Locke, however, habit could
emerge as an ontological principle. It is important to note that in Edwards’ time, the concept of
substance was undergoing fundamental changes because of Newtonian science and empiricism.
Lee is arguing that the ontology that Edwards is putting forward is that the real nature of things
in the world is the habitual pattern of relations among ideas.
According to Lee, Edwards’s idea of habit is “an active tendency that governs and brings
about certain types of events and actions” (Lee 35). Lee explains that Edwards uses this notion of
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habit in a radically new way that replaces the concept of substance. Potentiality and activity are
being brought into the very inner nature of being rather than simply being operative. With
Edwards, “dispositions and habits, conceived as active and ontologically abiding principles play
the roles substance and form used to fulfill” (Lee 4). The created world is to be understood as a
network of divinely established habits, which can also be referred to as the laws of nature. This
means that Edwards believed that the essence of created things is a compound of habits/laws.
This would be a form of bundle theory, similar in nature to what Hume proposed. According to
Hume, objects are just bundles of attributes. For Edwards (according to Lee), objects are bundles
of dispositional attributes. Lee’s view is that Edwards thinks that all the attributes that created
beings have are dispositional in nature. Habits do not belong to substances, but are constitutive
of their being. Being is essentially dynamic and relational.
This dispositional or habitual ontology is not only in the created order, but also applies to
God Himself. According to Lee, Edwards understood God as purely dispositional rather than as
substance. Lee draws from Miscellanies No. 107 when Edwards writes that “it is God’s essence
to incline to communicate Himself” (Edwards 107). He ties this with a section in Edwards’s The
End for Which God Created the World where Edwards states that God’s disposition to
communicate Himself “is what we must conceive of as being originally in God as a perfection of
His nature” (Edwards 207). Lee uses this to conclude that, for Edwards, “God’s disposition to act
as God...is the essence of the divine being” (Lee 175).
Oliver Crisp’s Objection to Lee
Oliver Crisp takes issue with this interpretation. He sees Edwards’s ontology as a version
of essentialism. Crisp argues that “through a misunderstanding of the way in which [the elements
of idealism, mental phenomenalism, and occasionalism] interrelate, Lee ends up with mistaken
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views on several important components of Edwards’ ontology” (Crisp 2). Crisp is building on
the traditional interpretation of Edwards’s ontology and offers an account that is able to make
sense of Edwards’ unusual language, while not requiring Lee’s stronger claims. Crisp’s account
seeks consistency between Edwards’s writings and the orthodox Christian views of the time. One
of the main points in his argument is that there is a simpler account of Edwards’s ontology that is
more clearly consistent with the rest of his views. Crisp argues that while Lee’s interpretation is
impressive and thorough, it is mistaken in its conclusions about Edwards’ ontology. Crisp argues
in favor of the more traditional interpretation of Edwards that views his ontology as a form of
essentialism. Essentialism is basically the doctrine that divides what exists into substances and
their modes.
Crisp states that it is fairly common to claim that entities have at least some dispositional
attributes, but controversial to claim that all the attributes a given agent has are dispositional.
This is what makes Lee’s account difficult to hold. Crisp argues that one should not attribute
obviously problematic views to a particular thinker unless there is very good evidence to do so.
Crisp points out that this dispositional account is problematic by giving the example “being
human.” Being human is not a dispositional property, but it is essential to the existence of a
human. With this example, Crisp demonstrates the difficulty of Lee’s interpretation in applying
purely dispositional attributes to humans and to God. While it could be the case that Edwards
held such a problematic view, Crisp reminds us that we must have very good reasons to believe
that he did if we are to accept it. Lee’s view becomes more problematic according to Crisp when
he argues that it is not the case that substances have dispositional habits, but that habits replace
substance entirely.
Crisp boils down Lee’s interpretation into three main points:
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1. All created beings are nothing more than bundles of attributes, ontologically.
2. There is no material or immaterial substratum upholding the attribute bundles.
3. All attribute bundles are upheld by the immediate exercise of divine power.
Crisp adds a fourth point to this, because there is ample evidence to believe that Edwards
believed that God is the only true substance. This fourth point would be, “The only true
substance is the divine substance, which upholds all created beings” (Crisp 7). This point is
consistent with essentialism, and it does not appear to have a place in Lee’s view. Lee’s claim
that God is essentially a disposition, rather than a substance, is inconsistent with Edwards’s claim
that God is the only true substance. Lee wants to account for change in Edwards’s view and
claims that while Edwards may have started out with idealism, he moved toward a dispositional
ontology.
Crisp believes Lee’s interpretation begins to unravel when he claims that Edwards moves
away from Berkeleyan idealism toward a purely dispositional idealism, wherein the world
continues to exist through the nexus of habits and laws that govern the world. Crisp argues that
none of Lee’s evidence requires this dispositional understanding because it is more consistent
with an ontological account where there are created and uncreated substances.
Lee also has to answer Edwards's belief in continuous creation. Continuous creation is
basically the idea that God creates the world ex nihilo moment-by-moment and that God is the
only causal agent in the world. Lee’s interpretation seems to be in opposition to Edwards’s
continuous creation. If God created habits or laws that govern the world, then God would not be
creating everything ex nihilo moment-by-moment. Crisp cites Edwards’ “Original Sin” as
evidence where he states that God’s upholding created things is “altogether equivalent to an
immediate production out of nothing at each moment, because its existence is not merely in part
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from God, but is wholly from him” (Edwards 401). This means, according to Crisp, that every
moment is numerically different from the next. So, if Edwards holds to continuous creation, then
there are no dispositional attributes that persist long enough to perform any action. God is
constantly recreating everything. Edwards’s idealism and continuous creation cannot be
accounted for in Lee’s interpretation. On Crisp’s reading, Edwards remains a traditional
substance metaphysician.
Examining the Text
I will begin by looking at specific texts that Lee uses to make his argument. The first text
that we will examine is Miscellany 241, which states that “all habits are a law that God has fixed,
that such actions upon such occasions should be exerted” (Edwards 241). This passage is able to
fit within Lee’s framework. The problem, however, is that this text is simply describing habits.
Edwards does not say that all attributes are habits, but rather that all habits are laws. This is the
passage upon which Lee builds his understanding of Edwards’s ontology. In the traditional
interpretation of Edwards, it is possible for Edwards to have reconceptualized “habit” in a unique
way without it being all that exists. Lee’s strong claim needs strong evidence because of its
radical nature, but I have not found anything in Edwards’ work that suggests all attributes are
dispositional. Because of this, it is more reasonable to understand the created order as
dispositional in some sense, but not purely dispositional.
Miscellany 241 is used again later in the book, because it states that the “[soul’s] essence
consists in powers and habits” (Edwards 241). Lee uses this to demonstrate that habits do not
simply belong to entities, but are constitutive of their being. This is coupled with a passage from
“Subjects to be Handled in the Treatise of the Mind” that states “laws. . .constitute all permanent
being in created things, both corporeal and spiritual” (Edwards 391). Lee’s understanding that
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“things...do not have habits, but are habits” is just as plausible as the traditional interpretation
given Edwards’s lack of clarity. Edwards does not go so far as to say that only laws constitute all
permanent being. If “constitute” here really means “to be a part of the whole,” then it would be
reasonable for Edwards to say that laws constitute permanent being without being committed to
only laws constituting being. Laws or habits are a part of the whole. Lee fails to consider how
this can be consistent with a substance ontology.
The next text that Lee uses to advance his interpretation is “Of Atoms.” In this essay,
Edwards explains that an atom is a body that cannot be made less. It is indivisible and
impenetrable. He, then, makes the claim that “solidity, indivisibility, and resisting to be
annihilated are the same thing” (Edwards 208). Next, he makes the claim that the solidity of
bodies and the being of bodies are the same thing. Lee takes this to mean that a body is not a
substance, but rather solidity, and solidity is an activity. If we stop here, then Lee’s interpretation
seems justified. But, as Lee admits, Edwards does not stop here. He goes on to conclude that
“solidity results from the immediate exercise of God’s power” (Edwards 214). On the surface,
this may sound like it supports Lee’s view, but we must remember one of Edwards’ core
doctrinal commitments: idealism. Solidity is just an idea in the mind of God, which is entirely
consistent with the rest of Edwards’s work, and is the more straightforward reading. So, where
Lee thought that Edwards was already abandoning traditional metaphysics, he was actually still
operating in the framework of substance and its modes.
In the very same essay, Edwards states that “there is no proper substance but God
Himself (we speak at present with respect to bodies only). How truly, then, is He said to be ens
entium” (Edwards 215).  Edwards clarifies “with respect to bodies only,” because he is
explaining his idealism. Bodies do not exist as substance. They exist as ideas in the mind of God.
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This is reminiscent of Berkeley’s idealism. Right above this, Edwards states that the certain
unknown substance that philosophers used to think subsisted by itself (substratum) was just
solidity itself. Where Lee would point this out as an activity, I would point out that this is an
idea. We see this in “Of Being” where Edwards writes that the universe “exists nowhere but in
the divine mind” (Edwards 206). This demonstrates that we do not have to abandon the
traditional interpretation of Edwards in favor of a dispositional ontology. These passages simply
point back to Edwards’ idealism. As Edwards notes in No. 34 of “The Mind,” “the existence of
the whole material universe is absolutely dependent on idea” (Edwards 352).
“The Mind” is a major text for Edwards’s ontology, so it is important that we take a
closer look. Edwards explains how the ideas that we passively receive through our bodies are
communicated to us immediately by God. If Lee’s interpretation were correct, then habits or
dispositions would be causal. However, Edwards is clear that everything that we perceive is the
direct result of God causing our perception. This is Edwards’s continuous creation, wherein God
is the only causal agent. God is creating the world out of nothing moment-by-moment, and
because of this, is causing our every experience. Edwards also states that “all truth is in the mind
and only there” (Edwards 340). This once again, supports his idealism, which states that the only
things that exist are minds and their ideas. Edwards’s continuous creation greatly troubles Lee’s
interpretation.
Edwards explicitly states that he is thinking in terms of substances and modes in No. 25
when he states, “the distribution of the objects of our thoughts into substances and modes may be
proper, if by substance we understand a complexion of such ideas which we conceive of as
subsisting together and by themselves and by modes, those simple ideas which cannot be by
themselves or subsist in our mind alone” (Edwards 350). The only way that Lee could explain
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this passage would be to say that what Edwards means by “ideas” is actually “habits.” This is not
an obvious reading. In No. 27, Edwards claims that objects are merely mental existences and that
the material universe exists nowhere but in the mind. In No. 61,  the only substance, for
Edwards, is God. He explains that it is natural for men to suppose that there is some latent
substance, or substratum, that upholds the properties of bodies, because the properties of bodies
are such that they need a cause. “That something is He by whom all things consist” (Edwards
380). This is a blatant affirmation of God as substance. These conclusions do not figure into
Lee’s interpretation of Edwards.
Edwards’s Use of Idealism, Essentialism, and Occasionalism
We have touched on the doctrines of idealism, essentialism, and continuous creation in
Edwards’s work, but I am going to explain how these work together to form the basis for
Edwards’s view. Idealism states that all that exists are minds and their ideas. Berkeley is the first
popular idealist in philosophical history. Berkeley maintained that matter was literally nonsense,
holding that only created and uncreated minds existed. This was close to the position that
Edwards held. As we have previously stated, Edwards believed that the only true substance is
God. It could still be the case, though, that human minds are created, immaterial, finite
substances. Or, Edwards could be understood as a panentheist that thinks that God is the only
substance. On this view, creation would be an extension of God. Regardless, for our purposes in
this paper, it is primarily important to note that Edwards was indeed an idealist.
Essentialism is controversial as a doctrine of Edwards as we have seen, since Lee and
others reject it entirely. It is important, though, to understand what this theory means since I have
spent most of the paper arguing in favor of it. Essentialism divides everything that exists into
substances and their modes. This is a major characteristic of Modern philosophy, starting with
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Descartes, through Spinoza, Leibniz, and Berkeley. Locke was one of the first of the period to
give less importance to the concept of substance, though it was still an important question to
answer for philosophers of that time. As I have argued, Edwards was committed to the concept
of substance, though it may have looked different from other conceptions of substance. The point
that shows Edwards’s commitment to essentialism is that he conceives of God as the only true
substance. This is enough to demonstrate that he was, in some capacity, working within the
framework of essentialism. Lee’s reading of Edwards’s substance language is insufficient,
because it requires us to reinterpret the plain language that Edwards uses.
Continuous creation is the third doctrine that we will briefly explain. As I have noted,
continuous creation holds that God continually creates the world out of nothing
moment-by-moment. This is important for Edwards, because it demonstrates how everything is
wholly dependent upon God. Edwards’s main concern in all of his theology and philosophy was
the glory of God, and this radical view of the world’s dependence upon God shows God to be
all-powerful. Without continuous creation, there would be objects in the world that were capable
of existing without the immediate exercise of God’s power. For Edwards, this was inconceivable.
This doctrine expresses God as the first and only cause. While philosophers like Locke
maintained a theory of cause and effect where one object can cause another object to move,
Edwards held that only God could cause an object to move. This, once again, shows the depth of
Edwards’ belief in God’s sovereignty and the created order’s dependence upon God.
The combination of these three key Edwardsian doctrines creates a view of Edwards that
cannot be consistent with Lee’s interpretation. Idealism answers many of the questions that Lee
thinks dispositional ontology answers. Essentialism reminds us that Edwards was actually
committed to the concept of substance, though Lee denies this. And continuous creation
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demonstrates that God continually creating the world out of nothing cannot be consistent with
God setting fixed laws into place to act upon things.
18
IV. History of Trinitarian Theology
Having established a basis for Edwards’ ontology, the conversation must move toward
Edwards’s trinitarianism. Before exploring Edwards’s own views, however, it is important to
situate him in the historical context of the development of the doctrine of the Trinity. As is the
case with his philosophical ontology, his theology was not developed in a vacuum. Much of his
theology was the result of combating heterodoxy. This is not uncommon in church history. Most
explicit statements of doctrine in the church came as a result of clarifying doctrines in
conversation with heretical or heterodoxical groups. This is especially true of the doctrine of the
Trinity. Because the Bible does not give a detailed explanation of how we are to understand the
Trinity, the Church’s explicit pronouncement on details about the Trinity was developed over
centuries. In fact, the word, trinitas, was not used until the late 2nd and early 3rd centuries with
Tertullian (Letham 98). This left the Christian Church with the difficult task of defining the
Godhead based on different stories and passages in the Bible. For our purposes, we will look at
how this development occurred throughout history, beginning with the 2nd century and ending
with Edwards.
Early Church Developments of the Trinity
The 2nd-century understanding of the Godhead is characterized most clearly by the 2nd
century apologists. This includes Justin, Tatian, Athenagoras, and Theophilus. These 2nd century
apologists saw Christ as the Father’s thought expressed in creation and revelation (Letham 88).
There were two things stressed. First was Christ’s eternal oneness with the Father as the Word
immanent in God. This is the beginning of the Trinitarian understanding of equality of persons in
the Godhead. Secondly, there was an emphasis on Christ’s appearance in human history as the
Word expressed or emitted (Letham 89). The 2nd century apologists stressed both Christ’s
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eternality and his appearance in humanity.  Here, we see the early traces of the doctrine of
Christ’s hypostatic union of divinity and humanity. The main issue with their understanding was
the unity of God. Theophilus even seems to conflate the Word and the Spirit of God. Because of
this, more development must take place to distinguish between the Word and the Spirit.
Theophilus was, however, the first to use the term “triad” in reference to God. This triad included
God, His Word, and His Wisdom. This foreshadows further developments.
The next advancement of the doctrine of the Trinity comes from Irenaeus (130-200).
Much of Irenaeus’s work on the doctrine of God is written in his book, Against Heresies. In this
book, he identifies the one true God with the Creator of the world, the God of the Old Testament,
and the Father of the Logos. He stresses the continuity of this God between the Old and New
Testaments. At this point, God is seen to be Creator and Father. Irenaeus also proves the
existence of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, but does not discuss in detail the relations of the
three. This provides a basis for future work to be done on the three persons of the Trinity, but
Irenaeus provides only the basis. He does not explain how the three interact and he does not
explicitly say that they are all God properly. He does, though, identify Jesus with the Christ and
the Son of God. He states that the Son was with the Father from the beginning and thus dispenses
the Father’s grace in human history (Letham 93). This gives us the beginnings of the Church’s
understanding of the economy of salvation. In the work of salvation, we see that the Father and
the Son are operating together. Specifically, Irenaeus explains that “the Father plans and gives
commands, the Son performs and creates, while the Spirit nourishes and increases” (Letham 93).
Much of Irenaeus’s work on the doctrine of God came in contrast to the unique speculations of
the gnostics.
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Tertullian (160-220) came shortly after Irenaeus. He drafts a statement of faith that is
similar to the forthcoming Apostle’s Creed. His statement claims belief “in the Paraclete, the
sanctifier of the Father of those who believe in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost”
(Letham 98). Tertullian was the first to use the primary terms that express the Trinity today:
“trinity,” “substance,” and “person.” He even claimed that the one God exists in three distinct
persons. The potential problem with Tertullian’s view is that he saw an ordering of the persons
that bordered on Subordinationism. For the early church, this view was heretical because it
taught that God the Son and God the Holy Spirit are ontologically subordinate, and thus inferior
to, God the Father. The one benefit of Tertullian’s tendency is that it set up a barrier to another
heresy known as Modalism. Modalism is the belief that God is one person that reveals himself in
three different modes: Father, Son, and Spirit. We are beginning to see here that going too far in
one direction or another typically leads to heresy.
The next significant figure in the development of the doctrine of the Trinity is Origen
(185-254). He claimed belief in the Only One God, who created all things out of nothing. This is
the God that appeared to the Old Testament saints. He also put forward a particular
understanding of the doctrine of eternal generation of the Son by the Father. Origen’s
interpretation borders on heresy, though, because he states that the Father communicates His
divinity to the Son at every instant. This implies that the Son is not divine in and of Himself. It
implies that the Son is reliant upon the Father for divinity, and thus would not be true God of true
God. This seamlessly leads us to Arius’s problematic claims about God in 256.
Arius was one of the first to be deemed by the Church to have a heretical view of the
Trinity. He claimed that God is unitary and the Father is unique. The substances of the Father,
Son, and Spirit were thought by Arius to be distinct. This is in direct contrast to the common
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modern-day definition of the Trinity, which is that God is three persons but one substance. This
led Arius to believe that the Son was a created being. Contrary to the 2nd century apologists’ and
the New Testament’s emphasis on the Son’s eternality, Arius believed that God the Father created
the Son ex nihilo. This places the Son in a position much closer to the rest of creation than to
God. Athanasius (295-373) enters the controversy shortly after, and seemingly saves the doctrine
of the Trinity. He is the first to define God’s triunity as “One Being, Three Persons.” He stresses
the full deity of the Son and the Spirit. His contributions are, arguably, the main basis for the
Council of Constantinople’s (381) conclusions.
Out of the Council of Constantinople came the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed. This
Creed provides a summarized articulation of what the early church came to understand about the
Godhead. It expresses belief in God the Father Almighty, One Lord Jesus Christ, and the Holy
Spirit. Jesus is defined as the only begotten Son before all ages, consubstantial with the Father.
The Holy Spirit is defined as Lord and Life-Giver who proceeds from the Father and who is
worshipped and glorified with the Father and the Son. Not much has substantially changed from
this Creed to the modern-day Christian understanding of the Trinity. While terms like
“substance” and “person” were later given important terminological precision, the Church has
maintained the basic definition given by the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed. Most orthodox
Christian churches that are orthodox still affirm the conception of the Trinity encapsulated in this
creed. The developments after this are mainly developments in emphasis rather than content.
Augustine (354-430) was one of the first prolific writers on the Trinity. His attention is
thought to be rooted firmly on essential unity, though later in this paper, I will challenge this
interpretation. But, for now, it is important to note that he is charged with moving close to the
Modalist heresy, because of his emphasis on the unity of the divine persons. He makes the
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significant claim that creation is an act by the Father through the Son in the Spirit. This specifies
a single act, rather than three separate actions, further emphasizing the Godhead’s unity.
Augustine also claims that God has one will, one power, and one majesty. There is not an act
done by any of the Three in which all do not have a part (Letham 187). He also understands the
Spirit as the communion and love of the Father and the Son. This is a key aspect of Edwards’s
own understanding of the Trinity that will be explored later in this paper.
Within the history of the doctrine of the Trinity, there is thought to be a major divergence
between the East and the West. This began with the Filioque Controversy. Filioque is a Latin
term that means “and from the Son.” The Creed that came from the Council of Constantinople
states that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. In the late 6th century, some Western
churches added that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and from the Son. From this point
forward, the East is charged with believing that the Holy Spirit proceeds strictly from the Father,
and the West is charged with believing that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the
Son. While there is much to say about this controversy, for our purposes, it is only important to
see this as a divide between Eastern and Western understanding of the Trinity. This divergence
between the East and West dominates the historical developments of the Trinity up until the
Reformers.
Developments from the Reformers
There was much speculation regarding the Trinity in the Medieval period. Many
theologians were just as much philosophical as they were theological, and their philosophical
understandings influenced their theology. John Calvin (1509-1564) marked a return to Scripture
over speculation. It is contested just how uncomfortable Calvin was with philosophical language.
In some cases, it seems that he is engaging in scholasticism, but in regards to the Trinity, Calvin
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sought to understand the doctrine strictly from what the Bible said rather than through
philosophical speculation. He seems to have stressed the three persons of the Trinity more than
the one essence. This is not because he thought that plurality was more important than unity, but
rather because he was combating Modalism. He stressed the eternal deity of the Son and the
Spirit because it was common to emphasize the deity of the Father over the deity of the Son and
Spirit. Once again, in the historical development of the Trinity, emphasis is placed as a result of
combating heresy. Calvin attempts to combine Eastern and Western interpretations of the Trinity
by saying that there is eternal generation of the Son and eternal procession of the Spirit. In this
way, he is able to maintain that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, but that the Son
is still generated by the Father. Calvin’s stress on scriptural language for articulating the Trinity
influenced forthcoming understandings of the Trinity, because people became more careful with
their speculation (Letham 270).
Developments from the Puritans
William Ames (1576-1633) was a famous Puritan who had a deep influence on Edwards.
In his book, Marrow of Divinity, Ames provided an early Puritan expression of Trinitarianism.
This included the following four claims:
1. The subsistence of God is that one Essence, as it is with its personal properties.
2. The same essence is common to three subsistences; and as touching the Deity, every
subsistence is of itself.
3. Moreover, nothing is attributed to the Essence, which may not be attributed to every
subsistence in regard to the essence of it.
4. But those things that are attributed properly to every subsistence, cannot be attributed to
the essence.
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These four statements summarize the theological context regarding the Trinity that Edwards
would soon enter.
John Owen (1616-1683) is the last theologian that we will discuss regarding the Trinity
before exploring Edwards’s view. In Owen, like Calvin, we find an absence of philosophical
terminology. In place of that, we find profuse biblical exegesis. He was a synthesizer of those
that came before him. Calvin’s influence is especially strong. Because of his lack of
philosophical speculation, his developments are not new in any substantive way. Rather than
coming up with new ideas, he is deepening understanding of what the Church had believed
centuries prior. Owen affirmed that God is One, and that this one God is the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Spirit. He clarifies that the Holy Spirit is not merely the power of God, but rather an
eternally existing divine substance. He was committed to the Filioque, and can be considered
“Western” in that sense, though he was also concerned with the three persons like the “East.”
One significant aspect of Owen’s thought is that he was able to avoid the dangers of Aquinas’s
doctrine of divine simplicity by specifying that God’s “will is not coterminous with His essence”
(Letham 7). While Owen does hold to divine simplicity, he avoids the potential dangers of
oneness with this specification. This will be important when we turn to Edwards and his
struggles with divine simplicity.
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V. Interpreting the History of Trinitarian Theology
Now that we have sufficient knowledge of the events and main theologians in the history
of Trinitarian theology, we need a proper hermeneutic by which to interpret this history. Amy
Plantinga Pauw is one of the most thorough writers on Edwards’s view of the Trinity. She reads
Edwards through the lens of the Threeness - Oneness paradigm. By utilizing this paradigm,
Plantinga Pauw concludes that Edwards’s Trinitarian theology is an aspect of his dispositional
ontology. It is clear so far that I think viewing Edwards’s ontology as strictly dispositional is
unfounded, but at this point in this paper, I am locating this within Edwards’s view of the Trinity.
Rather than interpreting Edwards through the threeness-oneness paradigm, I will be defending
Steve Studebaker’s view that we ought to interpret Edwards’s Trinitarianism in light of its
historical-theological context (Studebaker 270). This context includes the Trinitarian
Controversy that was present at the time and the rise of deism in the late 17th and early 18th
centuries. I will also explain how a misreading of Augustine’s work on the Trinity has led to this
misinterpretation of the history of Trinitarianism. As such, Edwards’s view is actually aligned
most closely with Augustine’s mutual love model of the Trinity.
Threeness-Oneness Paradigm
Before explaining how the threeness-oneness paradigm is misleading, it is important to
understand what it is exactly. It is a hermeneutic that “reduces the theological history of
trinitarianism to the conceptual idioms of threeness and oneness” (Studebaker 271). This
threeness-oneness divide is seen as a divide between how the East and West understands the
Trinity. The hermeneutic suggests that Eastern Trinitarianism starts with an understanding of the
plurality/threeness of divine persons as the most fundamental aspect of the Godhead. Western
Trinitarianism starts with understanding the oneness and unity of God as the most fundamental
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aspect of the Godhead. Eastern Trinitarianism is represented by Richard St. Victor and the
Cappadocians, while the West is represented by Augustine.
This paradigm locates the difference between the East and West in the analogies used to
describe the Trinity. The Augustinian tradition is identified by Augustine’s psychological model
of the Trinity. According to this interpretation, Augustine suggests that God the Father is the
mind (or memory), who generates God the Son by an eternal act of self-reflection. God the Holy
Spirit proceeds as the mind’s self-love of its self-knowledge. Augustine employed another, less
widely-known analogy describing the relations between the Godhead. This is called the mutual
love model. This model demonstrates that the Holy Spirit is the bond of love that unites the
Father and the Son. In the psychological analogy, the Holy Spirit is defined as the Father’s love
for the Son, whereas the mutual love model defines the Spirit as the mutual love of the Father for
the Son and of the Son for the Father. In both analogies, Augustine uses “the mental operations
of one person to illustrate the immanent Trinitarian relations” (Studebaker 272).
The threeness tradition employs the three-person analogy to describe the Trinity. In this
analogy, the Trinity is explained by the example of Peter, James, and John. They are three
distinct persons, but they all share a common nature of humanity. The threeness tradition uses
this to show that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three distinct persons that share a common
nature of divinity. Each divine person is a particular instance of the divine essence. The threeness
tradition charges the oneness tradition with being monistic and modalistic, characterizing
Augustine as the architect of this problem.
Problems with the Paradigm
It is not uncommon for scholars to use the threeness-oneness paradigm without
investigating its validity. For example, Plantinga Pauw uncritically assumes this paradigm in her
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interpretation of Edwards. She does not provide evidence for this understanding of
Trinitarianism.
This paradigm was not used until the late 19th century with the French theologian,
Thėodore de Regnon (Studebaker 274). De Regnon did not use the terms “threeness” and
“oneness” but rather “patristic” and “scholastic.” For him, the patristics emphasized God’s
threeness and the scholastics emphasized God’s oneness. The patristic era is represented by the
Cappadocians and the scholastic era is represented by Augustine. We can see here how this
paved the way for the threeness-oneness paradigm.
One of the major problems with the paradigm is that it forces a reading of certain
theologians, like Augustine, that lifts particular passages out of their literary context. Plantinga
Pauw strictly uses Book 9 of De Trinitate to definitively understand Augustine’s Trinitarianism
in terms of the mental triad. The problem with this hermeneutic is that it ignores the fact that
“Augustine uses the mental triads in at least five forms to illustrate the doctrine of inseparable
external operations, the incarnation, and how God is at once a trinity of persons and yet only one
God” (Studebaker 275). This understanding of Augustine takes a few samplings of his work on
the Trinity and generalizes his thought.
Another problem with using Augustine as the token Western Trinitarian is that it
understands him apart from his historical-theological context. The threeness-oneness paradigm
associates Augustine more with a Neoplatonic philosophy than with his theological background.
It assumes that his doctrine of divine simplicity and formulation of divine unity arise from
Neoplatonism. While it is true that Neoplatonism influenced Augustine in significant ways, it is
not clear that he was pulling from a cohesive catalog of Neoplatonic writings (Studebaker 276).
Divine simplicity may be consistent with Neoplatonism, but it should not be used as evidence for
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understanding Augustine as being dominated by Neoplatonism. Augustine was more concerned
with Scripture than Neoplatonism. The Old Testament emphasizes the oneness of God, which is
more likely to be the reason that Augustine also emphasized divine simplicity. Therefore, we
cannot view Neoplatonism as Augustine’s primary influence. Neoplatonism does not discredit a
reading of Augustine that emphasizes triunity.
In contrast, Augustine’s historical-theological background gives us a clearer picture of his
doctrine of divine simplicity. During the late 4th century, the pro-Nicene doctrine of inseparable
external operations was pervasive (Studebaker 277). This is the doctrine that appears as
Augustine’s formulation of divine simplicity throughout his writings. This takes into
consideration writings from “Epistle 11 – Augustine’s earliest trinitarian writing (389), Sermon
52 (410–12), in a later writing – Tractate 20 (418–19), and throughout De Trinitate” (Studebaker
277). Augustine’s use of the mental triad is used primarily to demonstrate the doctrine of
inseparable operations rather than God’s oneness. His purpose with these analogies was to show
how one divine person can accomplish a divine act, like the Son in the Incarnation, while the
Father, Son, and Spirit operate inseparably. This doctrine assumes a specific divine unity that
understands the three divine persons as essential to divinity.
Due to the problems with the threeness-oneness paradigm, I will not be using it to
interpret the history of Trinitarian theology. Moreover, I will not use it to understand Edwards’s
doctrine of the Trinity. Instead, I will use Edwards’s historical-theological context to interpret his
understanding of the Trinity. The significance of this interpretation is that it will lead us away
from understanding his doctrine as primarily threeness. Ultimately, this will lead us away from
viewing his ontology as primarily dispositional.
29
VI. Edwards’s View of the Trinity
Plantinga Pauw’s Interpretation
As stated previously, Amy Plantinga Pauw is one of the most thorough writers on
Edwards’s doctrine of the Trinity. As such, her writings deserve ample attention. She concludes
that Edwards aligned with the threeness position, or social trinitarianism. Her evidence includes
a specific text from Edwards, Miscellany 571, and his doctrines of consent and excellency. First,
we will look at Miscellany 571. In this Miscellany, Edwards addresses the Christian’s future state
in heaven. This is where he discusses how believers are united to Christ and able to enjoy
communion with the Father. He employs a particular understanding of the Trinity to show how
believers are welcomed into communion. Edwards explicitly uses social terms to describe the
fellowship between believers, Christ, and the Father. He writes that the people of God “should be
in a sort admitted into that society of three persons in the Godhead” (Miscellany 571). If we
already have the oneness-threeness paradigm in mind, then this text may strike us as evidence of
Edwards adhering to the threeness tradition. But, if we understand that this oneness-threeness
paradigm was not used until the 19th century and that it may not be the correct interpretation,
then this is just a piece of Edwards’s writing that acknowledges the plurality of persons in the
Godhead. Therefore, the use of these terms does not provide sufficient evidence to identify
which Trinitarian model Edwards is utilizing, and, in fact, relies on an anachronism.
The next way that we can look at this text is from a conceptual framework. The question
we must ask is: “what trinitarian model is most compatible with this notion of union with Christ
and participation in the immanent fellowship between the Father and the Son?” (Studebaker
280). Fortunately, Edwards answers this question by saying that “they all have communion in the
same spirit, the Holy Ghost” (Miscellany 571). The Spirit is the bond of communion. This aligns
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most clearly with Augustine’s mutual love model. The Spirit’s economic role is tied to his
relation to the Father and the Son. The Spirit’s bond of love is what allows humanity to
commune with the Godhead. Plantinga Pauw sees this text as affirmation of the threeness
tradition rather than a utilization of the mutual love model. This is because she is presupposing
the threeness-oneness paradigm. This becomes fatal to her understanding of Edwards’s doctrine
of the Trinity.
The next evidence from Plantinga Pauw that I will analyze is her understanding of the
theological concepts of consent and excellency. She believes that these doctrines led him to
social trinitarianism. There are a few times in Edwards’s writings on the Trinity where he claims
that God is excellent by virtue of loving consent, and therefore, must be a plurality. We see this
clearly in Miscellany 117 when he writes, “Then there must have been an object from all eternity
which God infinitely loves. But we have showed that all love arises from the perception, either of
consent to being in general, or consent to that being that perceives” (Miscellany 117). This could
be taken as an example of Edwards employing social trinitarianism, or it could be an instance of
the Augustinian mutual love model. In The Mind, Edwards claims that God’s excellence is his
love for himself, which is the mutual love between the Father and the Son, and this mutual love
is the Holy Spirit (The Mind 364). By reading this in combination with Miscellany 117, we can
see how Edwards is using Augustine’s mutual love model. In Discourse on the Trinity, “Edwards
maintains that the fellowship between the Father and the Son consists in the Holy Spirit” and this
Holy Spirit, being the mutual loving consent of the Father and the Son, is the excellency of God
(Studebaker 281). This reading, unlike Plantinga Pauw’s, does not commit Edwards to social
trinitarianism.
31
Now that we have consulted Edwards’s texts concerning consent and excellency, it is
evident that he is employing the mutual love model. Plantinga Pauw interprets his use of social
terms as evidence for social trinitarianism. This is because she is beginning with the assumption
that social terms are evidence of the threeness tradition and terms of unity are evidence of the
oneness tradition. But, as we have seen, this is not necessarily the case. If the lens of the
threeness-oneness paradigm is taken off, then we are left with an interpretation of Edwards that
views him in light of his historical-theological context. With this, it is clear that Edwards is
aligning himself with the Augustinian tradition. The threeness-oneness paradigm does not allow
for this interpretation, because it sees Augustine as being fundamentally monistic rather than
pluralistic. But, a consultation of his writings demonstrates that we should not interpret him
strictly as one over the other. The same conclusion can be made regarding Edwards.
Reading Edwards in his Historical-Theological Context
Rather than using the insufficient threeness-oneness paradigm, I will attempt to situate
Edwards in his historical-theological context. As was demonstrated in the historical overview of
Trinitarianism, most doctrinal developments occur as a response to heresy. Edwards’s doctrinal
articulations can be seen as combating the heretical views in his day. One of the significant
aspects of his context was the Trinitarian Controversy, which was a late seventeenth- and early
eighteenth-century debate about the Trinity. It originated with Samuel Clarke (1675-1729), who
was a British metaphysician and theologian. He was heavily influenced by Locke and Newton.
Clarke was infamous for diverging from an orthodox understanding of the Trinity. He was
charged with teaching a form of modalism. He taught that the Son derives from the Father by the
will of the Father and as such is not a necessary being (Studebaker 283). He emphasized that
God is one and only the Father is properly God, because if the Son and the Spirit were also God,
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then there would be three separate Gods. This was a form of modalism, because Clarke implied
that the Son and the Spirit were manifestations of the Father.
Clarke aligned with the deists in believing the unity of God precluded the Trinity. This
understanding of God’s oneness fit within the rationality of the Enlightenment, where the
doctrine of the Trinity appeared to contradict reason. Edwards was adamant that an orthodox
understanding of God did not contradict reason. He sought to demonstrate the rationality of the
Christian religion through philosophical reasoning. This leads us to another important aspect of
Edwards’s context: deism. The deists argued that the Reformed understanding of predestination
opposed the goodness of God. By explaining that the Trinity is the mutual love of the Father and
the Son, Edwards attempted to show that the Trinity is the rational basis for belief in the
goodness and love of God. He argued that the solitary God that the deists believed in could not
be infinite love and goodness, because he would have no one with whom to exercise these
qualities. The Trinity provided a rational basis for the Reformed doctrines of the goodness of
God and predestination.
Edwards’s doctrine of the Trinity has the emphasis that it does because he opposed his
present cultural context. In this context, God’s plurality, rather than his oneness, was under
attack. Because of this, Edwards had more to say about God’s plurality. This seems plausible
when considering the history of the doctrine of the Trinity. In fact, it is expected. Throughout
Christian church history, theologians have emphasized whatever aspect of God is under attack.
The orthodox understanding of the Trinity has been established by different theologians and
philosophers emphasizing different, various true claims about the Trinity from century to
century. What Edwards is doing is not new. It is another iteration of what we have seen
throughout church history. Edwards’s work on the Trinity is a defense of Reformed theology as
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rational in an intellectual context that was pushing back. This is not the only work of Edwards
written for this reason. Original Sin and Freedom of the Will were both written to explain
Reformed doctrine in a rational way.
By acknowledging Edwards’s historical-theological context, we can understand his
emphasis on God’s threeness. He was defending the aspect of the Trinity that was under attack
by the Enlightenment Deists. Plantinga Pauw interprets this as a latent social trinitarianism.
However, I simply see this as a response to his theological context.This allows for a reading of
Edwards as an advocate of the mutual love model rather than boxing him into the arbitrary
threeness tradition.
Discourse on the Trinity
Now that we have a hermeneutic by which to read Edwards, we can look at his texts
regarding the Trinity in more depth. The first text we will look at is Edwards’s Discourse on the
Trinity. It is his most comprehensive writing on the Trinity. One of the most important aspects of
God, for Edwards, is God’s own happiness. He argues “God is infinitely happy in the enjoyment
of himself, in perfectly beholding and infinitely loving, and rejoicing in, his own essence and
perfections” (Trinity 113). Because of this, Edwards reasons that God must have an eternally
perfect idea of Himself. This idea that God has of Himself is His own image and perfect
representation that is ever in His view. This constitutes God’s enjoyment of Himself. God is able
to be all-loving and eternally happy and joyful because He is loving this perfect idea of Himself.
Edwards writes that what arises from this is “a most pure and perfect energy in the Godhead,
which is the divine love, complacence and joy” (Trinity 113). Edwards understands 1 John 4:8,
“God is love” to prove the plurality of persons in the Godhead. This is because love is essential
and necessary to God, and as such is expressed by eternal communion and fellowship.
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Now that Edwards has attempted to show the plurality of persons in the Godhead, he
must explain how there are multiple persons. He does this by furthering his explanation of God
and God’s perfect idea of Himself. Edwards explains that when we, creatures, have an idea of
something, there is always imperfection in it. When God has an idea, there is no imperfection.
Because of this, when God has an idea of Himself, there is actual duplicity. If God has an idea of
Himself “so as thence to have delight and joy in himself, he must become his own object”
(Trinity 114). He sees this idea of God as a substantial idea that has the very essence of God and,
thus, is truly and properly God. By thinking, God generates another person that is infinite, holy,
eternal, and the very same God. This perfect Idea of God is the Second Person of the Trinity
(Trinity 117). He is the only begotten Son that “is the eternal, necessary, perfect, substantial and
personal idea which God hath of himself” (Trinity 117). Edwards ends this section by explaining
how this view is consistent with Scripture.
Edwards then goes on to explain the third person of the Trinity. When God has the perfect
Idea of Himself, Edwards reasons that there is a “most pure act” that proceeds (Trinity 121). This
pure act is an infinitely sweet and holy energy between the Father and the Son. This is the mutual
love that they share for one another. The Godhead acts most perfectly and most infinitely in this
love of the Father for the Son and the Son for the Father. Edwards claims here that the Deity is
pure act. This perfect mutual love between the Father and the Son simply is the Holy Spirit.
Edwards ties in the verse from 1 John 4:8, explaining that God is love, because the Holy Spirit is
the love of the Father and the Son. The Holy Spirit “naturally expresses the divine nature as
subsisting in pure act and perfect energy, and as flowing out and breathing forth in infinitely
sweet and vigorous affection” (Trinity 122).  At this point, Edwards has shown that there are
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three divine persons. All good things are of God the Father, through God the Son, and in God the
Spirit.
We could stop here and assume that because Edwards has emphasized the plurality of
persons, that he is employing the social model of Trinitarianism. But, we must ask: how are we
to understand this plurality of persons? Are we to see them as fundamentally distinct rather than
fundamentally unified? As argued earlier, my view is that we ought to see this as an instance of
the Augustinian mutual love model. This Discourse seems to affirm this interpretation. Edwards
is quick to clarify that the Son and the Spirit are properly and truly God. He states that the whole
divine essence truly and distinctly subsists both in the divine Idea and divine Love.
Perichoresis
Perichoresis is a doctrine that does a lot for Edwards’s Trinitarianism. It refers to the
mutual indwelling of the divine persons. It is the way that Edwards gets around a seemingly
contradictory position. He affirms that there cannot be three centers of understanding and will in
God, because He is one God. But Edwards also affirms that there are three divine persons who
have understanding and will. These two ideas seem to contradict one another. That is, until
Edwards utilizes the doctrine of perichoresis. In his book, Jonathan Edwards Among the
Theologians, Oliver Crisp explains how Edwards employs perichoresis. He states that in the
Edwardsian understanding, the divine persons “have parceled out to them many of the divine
attributes usually thought to reside in the divine essence, apart from those that are ‘mere modes
or relations’ of God, such as immutability and eternity” (Crisp 49). Edwards identifies the Son
with divine understanding and the Spirit with divine love. Therefore, it appears that the Son is
divine understanding and the Spirit is divine love. These are not simply attributes of the divine
essence, they are divine persons. Without perichoresis, this is illogical. Perichoresis explains that
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each of the divine persons indwells the others, so “the divine understanding that is the person of
the Son is also possessed by the other two divine persons - he is their understanding” (Crisp 49).
The same can be said of the Spirit, who is their love and their will.
Kyle Strobel develops this understanding of Edwards’s use of perichoresis by explaining
that instead of the Father, Son, and Spirit being persons in their own right, the triune persons are
not persons individually. The Father is not a divine person without understanding and love, “so
also the Father is not a person without the Son or the Spirit” (Strobel 28). This is expressed most
clearly in the Discourse on the Trinity. Previously, I noted that Edwards is not using an
innovative model to understand the Trinity. This does not mean that Edwards is not being
innovative in any sense. His innovation is found in his particular use of perichoresis. He is using
Augustine’s model of the Trinity, but reconceiving it with perichoresis so that he retains “the
Augustinian notion of a single divine understanding and will” while “reallocating these to the
divine persons rather than retaining them within the divine essence” (Crisp 50). The three divine
persons are the only true distinctions within God, but they cannot be understood as persons in
isolation from one another. Strobel acknowledges that Edwards’s doctrine requires a particular
take on perichoresis in which the divine persons simply are the divine essence.
With this innovation in articulating the Trinity, Edwards is able to affirm excellency and
consent without adhering to social trinitarianism. He understands the unity and plurality of God
simultaneously through perichoresis. Edwards affirms the Augustinian notion that the Godhead
has one understanding, one love, and one will that is shared between the divine persons, but he
diverges with his particular use of perichoresis. In this theological move, Lee supposes that
Edwards distances himself from the notion of the divine essence. Rather than Edwards distancing
himself from the notion altogether, it seems that he is reinterpreting divine essence. As Strobel
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states, “In contrast to seeing the Father as the only person in whom the divine attributes obtain,
Edwards posits that the divine attributes actually are the Son and the Spirit” (Strobel 236). This
means that the divine persons are the divine essence. In this way, contra Lee, we can see
Edwards more closely aligns with the language used before him. It is clear that what Edwards is
doing is innovative and new in some regard. This innovation, however, simply exists at the level
of articulation. He is not proposing a new understanding of the Trinity. He is simply articulating
his received theological tradition in a different way.
Locke’s Influence on Edwardsian Trinitarianism
Previously in this paper, I mentioned John Locke’s philosophy and that Edwards relied on
it for his Trinitarianism. Now, I will explain how Edwards used Locke’s unitary conception of
the will. Edwards argues that the difference between God and ourselves is a difference in degree
of perfection. Because of this, God is “a mind with the essential powers of understanding and
will, following Locke's account of human nature” (Helm). According to Paul Helm, the Godhead
is a case of a Lockean mind, but accompanied by perfection and pure spirituality (Helm). When
Edwards is proving the existence of the Second Person of the Trinity, he is utilizing Locke’s
concept of ideas of reflection. The idea that God has of Himself is a case of an idea of reflection.
It is a perfect example of a Lockean idea of reflection, because God has no ideas of sensation
since He is pure spirit. God’s perfect idea of Himself is thus truly a duplicity, as Edwards argues
in his Discourse on the Trinity.
Locke’s concept of the unity of the mind is also utilized by Edwards when proving the
Third Person of the Trinity. This proof is more focused on the willing power of the mind, since
the Holy Spirit is the love and will of God. Helm expresses this clearly when he states that for
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Edwards, “the sum of God’s will is His loving Himself” (Helm). This is how he explains
Edwards’s argument for the third person of the Trinity:
1. God is necessarily love.
2. Love is essentially other-regarding.
3. God necessarily loves another, the idea of Himself, the Son.
4. The Holy Spirit is that love. (Helm)
God’s holiness, justice, mercy, grace, etc. are God’s own love to Himself. The way that Edwards
makes sense of God’s attributes, once again, is by appealing to perichoresis. While Edwards was
clearly influenced by Locke, it is important to remember that Reformed orthodoxy was more
important to Edwards than Locke’s philosophy. Locke’s ideas were used by people all throughout
Europe to strengthen their own philosophies. Similarly, Edwards used Locke’s ideas to
strengthen his own Puritan orthodoxy.
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VII. How Edwards’s View of the Trinity and His Ontology are Inextricably Tied
Essentialism
As we have seen, Lee dispenses with Edwards’s essentialism. While this is significant for
Edwards’s ontology, it is equally significant for his Trinitarianism. Lee argues that Edwards
abandons the Early Modern concept of substance and modes in favor of a dispositional account
of being. I disagree with this reading, because Edwards uses substance language in articulating
the Trinity. For Lee’s reading to be correct, it would have to overlook Edwards’s clear use of
substance language.
Edwards actually discusses substance in his Discourse on the Trinity. When writing about
the Second Person of the Trinity, Edwards says this:
Therefore as God with perfect clearness, fullness and strength understands himself, views
his own essence (in which there is no distinction of substance and act, but it is wholly
substance and wholly act), that idea which God hath of himself is absolutely himself.
This representation of the divine nature and essence is the divine nature and essence
again (Trinity 116).
In this passage, Edwards is explicitly affirming essentialism. God’s substance is wholly
substance and wholly act. If Edwards was abandoning the notion of substance altogether, surely
he would not use language of substance metaphysics. Or, if he did, surely he would clarify at
some point in his writing that he was understanding substance only in terms of disposition. As I
have argued above, however, Lee misreads Edwards’s understanding of habits. Moreover, Lee’s
interpretation strains the plain reading of Edwards’s words. If Edwards was not operating under
the framework of essentialism, then it would change our understanding of his Trinitarian view. If
Edwards was arguing that God is fundamentally disposition rather than substance, then he would
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not be able to affirm the traditional definition of the Trinity as one substance, three persons.
However, since I have established above that Edwards maintains the traditional understanding of
the Trinity, this is, on my view, incorrect.
Plantinga Pauw’s Interpretation
Plantinga Pauw argues that Lee’s interpretation of Edwards’s ontology actually makes
more sense of Edwards’s Trinitarianism. The Supreme Harmony of All is one of the most
thorough works on Edwards’s doctrine of the Trinity. In this book, Plantinga Pauw makes the
case that Edwards’s Trinitarian reflections provide a strong link between his metaphysics and his
zeal for the church. She argues that “in the case of Edwards, attention to the Trinity is requisite to
understanding his metaphysics'' (Plantinga Pauw Ch. 2). My argument is similar to Plantinga
Pauw’s in that we both see Edwards’s Trinitarianism as essential to understanding his
metaphysics. We diverge in the way we interpret his Trinitarianism and metaphysics. She argues
that the Trinity was the paradigm of a “new concept of being” that Edwards was promoting. In
this supposed new concept of being, to be means to be intentionally related. Much of Plantinga
Pauw’s interpretation comes from Lee’s interpretation of God as disposition. What is unique to
Plantinga Pauw is her emphasis on Edwards’s Trinitarianism as a requisite to understanding his
metaphysics.
Plantinga Pauw argues that Edwards is saying that physical reality is not a collection of
independent substances. She appeals to Edwards when he states that “every real being must, as a
condition of its reality, stand in some relation to other things and even to all other things” (Works
6 p. 85). She argues that Edwards’s Trinitarianism is social/relational and his ontology is
dispositional. These are inextricably tied.
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Plantinga Pauw sees tension within Edwards’s theology between the divine simplicity of
the Medieval and Reformed traditions and the Trinitarian threeness of the East. Because of this
tension, she claims that “the notion of divine simplicity was never truly incorporated into
[Edwards’s] theology” (Ch. 2) and that there were more indications of departure than indications
of adherence. Edwards supposedly developed an alternative conception of oneness that revolved
around the notions of excellency, harmony, and consent. This provided a metaphysical alternative
to divine simplicity, because the doctrine of divine simplicity was typically accompanied by
substance metaphysics. When Edwards affirmed triplicity, she sees this as flatly denying divine
simplicity.
What is surprising is that after asserting that divine simplicity was never incorporated
into Edwards’s theology, Plantinga Pauw admits that he occasionally affirmed divine simplicity
outright. Of course, she suspects that he does this reflexively rather than thoughtfully. But, an
outright affirmation of divine simplicity ought not be brushed to the side. Edwards explicitly
says that God is perfect and simple in Freedom of the Will and he never explicitly denies this
(Works 1, p. 377). Plantinga Pauw ignores this by saying that Edwards does not explain
simplicity. This is an odd argument considering Plantinga Pauw discusses, in depth, the
Reformed tradition’s understanding of simplicity. Edwards stands squarely in the Reformed
tradition. Why should we assume there is a break between the two, especially since Edwards
explicitly affirms divine simplicity. Would it not be strange for him to use the language of one of
their primary doctrines and mean something entirely different? If Edwards did, in fact, use divine
simplicity in a new way, he surely would have explicitly redefined it. While Edwards may not
always be a simple writer, he is a thorough writer.
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Plantinga Pauw states that Edwards does actually explicitly reject divine simplicity in his
Discourse on the Trinity. The text she uses as evidence is “If a man should tell me that the
immutability of God is God or that the omnipresence of God and authority of God, is God, I
should not be able to think of any rational meaning of what he said” (Trinity 119). It might be
tempting to assume he does reject simplicity from this passage if we read it apart from his other
works. But, accompanied with the rest of Edwards’s writings, this interpretation becomes less
enticing. This is where Kyle Strobel’s interpretation sheds light on what Edwards is doing.
Strobel suggests that Edwards is able to maintain divine simplicity with his particular spin on
perichoresis, where the Son is the understanding and the Spirit the love of God and these
attributes are person-constituting. Perichoresis is the way in which Edwards maintains divine
simplicity. Edwards sees both the threeness and the oneness of God through the lens of
perichoresis. God is One, because He is not an amalgam of parts. He cannot be understood as
different parts/characteristics pieced together. This does not negate a Trinitarian view, because
the three persons of the Trinity cannot be understood apart from one another. The Trinity is three
persons, but these persons are not parts of a whole. They are tied inextricably to one another. In
this way, Edwards is able to affirm the triunity of Trinitarianism.
My View of Edwards’s Trinitarianism and Ontology
As I have expressed elsewhere, I find it to be the case that Edwards’s Trinitarianism and
his ontology cannot be understood apart from one another. To start, it is important to bring
together all of the different philosophers and theologians that influenced Edwards. I am taking
Edwards to be fundamentally Augustinian. This means that I think his view of the Trinity is not
radically new, but can be found mostly in Augustine’s writings. What I find to be new in
Edwards is his specific use of perichoresis alongside a basically Augustinian model to further
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explain the Trinity. Edwards is in a historical-theological context where many theologians
actively decided to stop speculating about the Trinity in a philosophical way. People like John
Calvin feared that speculation would breed heresy or unorthodoxy. While it seems that Edwards
was concerned with orthodoxy, he does not seem to share this same concern with Calvin.
Edwards is expanding on the Trinity in ways that those before him were reticent to do. He is
comfortable going beyond what Scripture says about the Trinity. Because of this, he is able to
develop a Trinitarian philosophy rather than just a Trinitarian theology. Though he does push the
boundaries of orthodoxy, Edwards remains in his received theological tradition.
I also view Edwards’s work as a result of his philosophical context. It is evident that the
Early Modern philosophical period is marked by a focus on substance metaphysics. Edwards
may have been less concerned with substance than someone like Descartes, but it is not clear that
he rejected the notion altogether. As I have quoted, Edwards uses the language of substance
metaphysics. Edwards would have been clearer had he actually dispensed with this
understanding. Edwards was clear when he was pushing the boundaries of Scripture in his
discussion of the Trinity by saying that he was willing to speculate. Because of this, it seems that
he would have done the same with his metaphysics. Because of the influence of Locke and
Malebranche on Edwards, it seems that he was using the same metaphysical framework that they
used, even if they diverged in certain ways.
Edwards’s innovation is found in his synthesis of metaphysics and Trinitarianism.
Edwards understands the world through the lens of substance. God is the only proper substance.
We should not conclude that God is pure disposition because (1) this interpretation is not clear
throughout Edwards’s writings and (2) this would be a radically new view in the Early Modern
period. Edwards uses the phrase “created substance” to explain creatures. This appear to be a
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contradiction in terms considering that substance refers to something that exists independently. It
may be tempting to reconfigure an interpretation of Edwards that does not lead to this
contradiction. But, this apparent contradiction does not imply that Edwards was not
understanding the world through substance. It simply means that his beliefs about substance may
not have been convincing. For Edwards, God is pure spirit rather than material, and everything
that exists comes from the mind of God. This is where Edwards’s idealism is clear. There is no
material substance, only ideas. Therefore, humans and plants and animals and all created things
are only ideas in the mind of God.
God would no longer be pure act if God were purely dispositional. As we have seen,
however, Edwards clearly believed this was true of God. The interpretation of God as disposition
necessitates the possibility of God increasing. If God is able to increase, then there must be
potentiality in God. Edwards does not believe there is any potentiality in God. In order to
account for God’s actuality, He must be substance rather than disposition. Because God is
substance, Edwards is able to affirm that the Trinity is one substance and three Persons. The
substance of God is what accounts for the divine essence. In this way, God can be understood as
One Being. If God was pure disposition, His simultaneous oneness and threeness would not be
clear. This is because disposition is difficult to grasp as the fundamental building block of reality.
Edwards’s use of substance as the fundamental reality fits within his philosophical context. It
also allows for a reading that coheres with Edwards’s understanding of God as pure act.
This interpretation of Edwards sees him as an innovative synthesizer of the opinions
before him. Edwards was well-read, and considered many different philosophical positions. He
was able to use Locke’s philosophy in accordance with Reformed orthodoxy alongside
Malebranche’s idealism to create an understanding of the Trinity that is tied to a view of God as
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the only true substance. This is a unique position in that it is a combination of views that do not
obviously go together. Edwards uses the philosophy and science of his time to articulate a view




In sum, I have argued that Edwards used the Early Modern framework of substance in
order to understand the fundamental realities of nature. For Edwards, God is the only true
substance. He is not simply disposition, because if He were, He would be in a state of
potentiality. Edwards is clear that God is pure actuality. Because of this, God must be substantial.
This One God is three Persons. These three Persons are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.
Edwards is able to assert both the unity and plurality of the Godhead.
Edwards is unique in that he was willing to explain the Trinity with analogies that were
not taken directly from Scripture. This sets him apart from some Reformed theologians like John
Calvin. This should not be interpreted as a break with the Reformed tradition, however.
Alongside the Reformed tradition, Edwards sought to explain Christianity in a rational way.
Though he was willing to use philosophical speculation in ways that not all Reformers were
comfortable with, his goal was the same. Edwards used philosophy to make sense of the
theological doctrine of the Trinity. He understood the Trinity in terms of his philosophical
ontology. He utilized doctrines of essentialism and idealism in an effort to understand the Trinity
in a rational way.
While Edwards was a unique figure in the history of philosophy and theology, I reject
Lee’s and Pauw’s interpretation that he was putting forth a new way of thinking about ontology
and the Trinity. Instead, Edwards used his intellect to articulate anew the old theological tradition
he had received. No doubt, controversy in Edwards scholarship will continue due to reignited
interest in his work. My hope is that the conversation will be made clearer by further attending to
Edwards’s historical and theological context.
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